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Out-of-Court Accusations Offered for
"Background": A Measured
Response From the Federal Courts
PROFESSOR DANIEL J. CAPRA
The two most important exclusionary rules in the Federal Rules of
Evidence are the hearsay rule (codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 801)
and Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The hearsay rule excludes out-of-
court statements when they are offered to prove that the information
related in the statement is true. Rule 403 operates to exclude evidence
when its probative value would be substantially outweighed by the
prejudice, confusion or delay that would result were the evidence
admitted.
As Ms. Hervic notes in her Comment, Rule 403 has an interesting
and complex relationship with the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule is pur-
pose-specific in its exclusion; it operates only where the statement is
offered to prove that the information related in the statement is true.
When an out-of-court statement is offered for something other than its
truth-a so called "not-for-truth purpose"-the hearsay rule is inappli-
cable. Upon appropriate objection, however, the trial court must balance
the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the statement under Rule
403; the evidence will have to be excluded where it is not very probative
for any not-for-truth purpose, and where there is a significant risk that
the jury will use the statement improperly for its truth. Such a use
would prejudice the opponent under the terms of Rule 403.
The interrelationship between Rule 403 and the hearsay rule is
brought into stark relief in a criminal case when the prosecution proffers
out-of-court statements accusing the defendant of criminal activity.
United States v. Evans is a recent example.1 Thomas Rose was serving
time and sought to cooperate with the authorities in order to get his
sentence reduced. He told FBI agents that Evans was involved in drug
trafficking. Thomas Rose then had his uncle, George, contact Evans,
using Thomas's name as a reference. Eventually, George asked Evans to
find some drugs for him, and Evans did so. At trial, Evans claimed
entrapment.
The government's first witness at trial was FBI agent Darnell.
Darnell testified about the origins of the undercover operation, including
1. 216 F.3d 80 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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the FBI's contacts with Thomas and George Rose. The agent was asked
how he "came about knowing Mr. Evans."' Over defense objection, the
agent testified that the FBI had "received information that Mr. Evans
was involved in drug trafficking" and that George Rose "was in a posi-
tion to directly go and approach Mr. Evans about narcotics."3 Evans
claimed that admission of this testimony was error, because it referred to
an out-of-court accusation and thus violated the hearsay rule and Rule
403.4
The government admitted that the FBI agent's testimony related an
out-of-court statement, i.e., a statement from an unnamed person-in
this case Thomas Rose-that Evans was involved in drug trafficking.
The government, however, argued that this statement was not offered to
prove that Evans was in fact involved in drug trafficking. Rather, it was
offered to explain why the FBI suspected Evans and decided to target
him for an undercover, investigation.'
Why would it make a difference if the statement is not offered for
its truth? Because the problem with hearsay is that it deprives the oppo-
nent of the opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the state-
ment-there is no way to assess whether the hearsay declarant is
credible. And the jury could treat the statement as true, even though
there is no demonstrable way of assessing its truth. As the Evans court
stated, cross-examination "is not of much use if there is no one to whom
it can be applied." 6 On the other hand, if the statement is really offered
to prove something other than the truth of the information related, then
we are not concerned about whether the hearsay declarant was telling
the truth. If it's not offered for its truth, then it would not even matter if
the declarant were lying. The hearsay declarant's credibility drops out
of the case; there is no reason to cross-examine a witness if his statement
is probative even if he is lying, because proving that he lied makes no
difference.
Whether an out-of-court statement can be admissible for a purpose
other than to prove the truth of its contents depends on whether it is
relevant to some disputed issue without regard to its truth. Thus, for
Thomas Rose's accusation about Evans to be admissible nonhearsay, it
would have to prove some fact of consequence other than the fact that
Evans was a drug dealer. The government in Evans proffered three
2. Id. at 84.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 84-85.
6. Id. at 85.
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interconnected explanations for how the out-of-court statement could
have been used other than for its truth.
First, the government argued that Thomas Rose's accusation was
relevant to show that Evans had not been improperly targeted or selec-
tively prosecuted. The contention was that even if the accusation were
not in fact true, it could have provided a proper basis for the FBI agents
to turn their suspicions and investigative resources toward Evans. The
problem for the government, however, was that this not-for-truth pur-
pose was not in dispute in the case. Thus, if the statement were in fact
offered to rebut an inference of selective prosecution, it should have
been excluded as insufficiently probative under Rule 403. As the court
noted, "selective prosecution may qualify as an issue of consequence in
some proceedings," but "it was not at issue in Evans trial."7 Evans
never raised an inference of selective prosecution, and the court noted
that Rose's accusation was elicited during the direct examination of the
first government witness, before Evans had presented a defense or even
begun to cross-examine.
The Evans court declared that if Rule 403 could not operate to
exclude out-of-court statements when offered to "explain" the uncon-
tested conduct of government agents, it would "open a large loophole in
the hearsay rule."8 As the court observed: "If we were to accept the
government's rationale here, then explaining why the government agents
did what they did through reference to statements of absent informants
would be acceptable in almost any case involving an undercover opera-
tion, and in many others as well."9
The government's second explanation in Evans, for why the out-of-
court statement was probative of something other than the truth of its
contents, fared no better. The government argued that the accusation
against Evans was necessary to combat "the threat of jury nullifica-
tion."" The government expressed concern that without the accusation,
the jury might miss "the moral significance of the allegations, and thus
render an unjustified acquittal."" The problem with this argument, is
that it depended specifically on the truth of the accusation that Evans
was a drug dealer. If Thomas Rose's allegation were false, then the
allegation would have no "moral significance" and acquittal would not
be "unjustified."' 2 Thus, the government's nullification argument failed
to articulate a not-for-truth purpose for the evidence.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 86.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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The government's final articulation of a not-for-truth purpose for
the accusation in Evans was that the statement was relevant as back-
ground.' 3 This explanation was found infirm as well. It was simply
another way of saying "we want to provide an explanation for the
actions of the police leading up to the arrest of Evans." The court found
that the probative value of the accusation for "background" was mini-
mal. 14 It was not very important to the case to show why the officers
focused on Evans. Of course, background of the investigation was not
completely irrelevant, for surely the jury would be curious as to how the
government set its sights on Evans. But the court found that the proba-
tive value was substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, given
the relative lack of importance of the police investigation to the con-
tested issues of guilt. 5 Therefore, the accusation should have been
excluded under Rule 403.
But in what regard was the accusation of drug activity "prejudi-
cial," if ostensibly offered only for the purpose of explaining the
officer's conduct? It could not be prejudicial simply because it strength-
ened the government's case; if "prejudice" meant "harm," then all of the
prosecution's evidence (including eyewitness and fingerprint testimony)
would be subject to exclusion as "prejudicial."' 6
The Evans court found the admission of Thomas Rose's accusation
to be prejudicial under Rule 403 in a different, more limited sense. It
noted that the prejudice inquiry "asks whether the jury was likely to
consider the statement for the truth of what was stated with significant
resultant prejudice."'" Thus, prejudice would result from the misuse of
the statement by the jury. For example, the jury might use the statement
as proof that Evans really was a drug dealer, even though to do so would
violate the hearsay rule and would be contrary to the government's
stated purpose for admitting the evidence. The Evans court concluded
its Rule 403 analysis as follows:
There was considerable danger that the jury would consider the infor-
mation about Evans' prior drug crimes for its truth, and hence as
evidence of his propensity to commit the crimes with which he was
charged. When that danger is weighed against the insignificant pro-
bative value of the testimony as background, the Rule 403 balance
comes out clearly against admission.' 8
13. Id. at 87.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 89.
16. See Dollar v. Long Mfg., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977) ("unfair prejudice within the
meaning of Rule 403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing party.
Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it is not material. The prejudice must be unfair").
17. Evans, 216 F.3d at 87.
18. Id.
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Evans illustrates that Rule 403 provides an important protection
when an out-of-court accusation is offered as nonhearsay for its effect
on the person who heard the statement, in this case the FBI agent. In
order to be admissible nonhearsay, the conduct of the listener in
response to the statement must be of some importance in the case, and
the statement must be probative to explain the listener's response or
state of mind, regardless of its truth. In many cases, statements accusing
defendants of crime are subject to exclusion under Rule 403 when
offered for "background" or "to explain the officer's conduct." Where
the question is whether the defendant is guilty, there is often only mini-
mal probative value in explaining why an officer acted in a certain way;
in contrast, there is a substantial risk of prejudice because the jury could
impermissibly use the statement for its truth.' 9
Unfortunately, there have been a number of instances in which the
courts have ignored the Rule 403 questions inherent in background evi-
dence, and in which hearsay statements have been offered to "explain"
events that are of minimal or no relevance. One example is United
States v. Norquay. ° Norquay was charged with rape, and witnesses tes-
tified that the victim told them that she had been raped. The court held
that the statements were properly admitted as nonhearsay because they
were offered not for the truth of their content, but rather "to explain why
the witnesses stopped for the woman on the highway late at night, took
her to the police station, and sent her to be interviewed by an investiga-
tor."2 ' This analysis is misguided. The probative value of the state-
ments for the articulated purpose was minimal because the conduct of
the witnesses at the time was only marginally relevant to the case. The
prosecution had little need to explain why the witnesses acted as they
did, when there was no dispute as to their actions. In contrast, the preju-
dicial effect of the statements was obvious because there was a strong
19. For another case illustrating this point, see United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.
1994) (reversing a conviction due to error in admitting statements made to a Customs agent which
implicated the defendant in a conspiracy. Even though the jury in Reyes was instructed that the
accusations were admitted only as "background," and the statements were somewhat relevant to
explain the background of the investigation, the court found a substantial danger that the jury
would have considered the statements for their truth anyway.) As the Reyes court stated, "the
mere identification of a relevant non-hearsay use of such evidence is insufficient to justify its
admission if the jury is likely to consider the statement for the truth of what was stated with
significant resultant prejudice." Id. at 70; see also United States v. Dean, 980 F.2d 1286, 1288
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that statements accusing the defendant of criminal activity, made to a
police officer, were improperly admitted for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining why the
officer went to the defendant's home to arrest him. The officer's reasons for going to the
defendant's home "are not of consequence to the determination of the action, i.e., they do not bear
on any issue involving the elements of the charged offense").
20. 987 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1993).
21. Norquay, 987 F.2d. at 479.
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likelihood that the jury would impermissibly use the statements for the
truth of their content: that the victim was actually raped.
Perhaps the Norquay Court would have ruled differently had
defense counsel specifically objected to the statements under Rule 403.
It appears that defense counsel in Norquay only made a hearsay objec-
tion. Once the prosecution articulated a legitimate not-for-truth purpose,
the hearsay objection was properly overruled, and it was incumbent on
defense counsel to argue specifically that the risk of the jury's misuse of
the statement would substantially outweigh the minimal probative value
of the statement for the purpose stated by the prosecution. If a Rule 403
objection is not specifically made at trial, it ordinarily will not be enter-
tained on appeal.22 In contrast, defense counsel in Evans specifically
objected on both hearsay and Rule 403 grounds to admission of Rose's
accusation of drug activity.23
Finally, it should be remembered that it will be proper, in certain
cases, to admit statements implicating defendants in criminal wrongdo-
ing in order to explain police activity or for "background." For example,
if the defendant does interpose a defense of selective prosecution, accu-
sations against him will be properly admitted to explain the officers'
motivation, as the court implied in Evans. Similarly, if a person brings a
claim for false arrest or excessive force, then accusations against him, of
which the arresting officer is aware, will be admissible not for their truth
but to prove the reasonableness of the officer's conduct.
Many of the above points are forcefully made by Ms. Hervic in her
Comment. Ms. Hervic, however, sometimes overstates her points, ren-
dering her Comment an exaggerated attack on courts in general and fed-
eral courts in particular. Ms. Hervic uses a good deal of firepower on
the United States Supreme Court, most notably its decision in Old Chief
v. United States.24 She asserts that the Court in Old Chief gave the gov-
ernment carte blanche to admit out-of-court accusations of the defen-
dant's criminal activity as evidence of background to the police
investigation.25 This is a most extravagant reading of Old Chief. First
of all, Old Chief is not a case dealing with hearsay at all. There is no
reference in the entire opinion to hearsay or to out-of-court statements.
22. See, e.g., Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that hearsay objection
at trial did not specifically request the trial court to weigh the prejudicial nature of the evidence
against its probative value; therefore the objection to the prejudicial nature of the evidence was not
properly preserved for appeal).
23. Evans, 216 F.3d at 84.
24. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
25. Joelle Hervic, Comment, Statements of Bystanders to Police Officers Containing an
Accusation of Criminal Conduct Offered to Explain Subsequent Police Conduct, 55 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 771, 781 (2001).
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Rather, Old Chief addresses whether a defendant has the right to have
probative-but-prejudicial evidence excluded by stipulating to the facts
on which the evidence is probative. Second, it should at least be noted
that the Court reversed Old Chief's conviction on the ground that the
trial court abused its discretion under Rule 403 by admitting evidence of
a prior conviction, even though the defendant had offered to stipulate to
the fact that he had been convicted. Thus, the result in Old Chief is
defendant-friendly. Third, much of the discussion in Old Chief concern-
ing Rule 403 is quite helpful to defendants faced with prejudicial evi-
dence. The Court specifically states that prosecutors do not have the
right to use probative-but-prejudicial evidence if there is equally proba-
tive but less prejudicial evidence available.26 The Court states that if
alternative evidence has "substantially the same or greater probative
value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice," the court under Rule 403
must "discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if its
discounted probative value [is] substantially outweighed by unfairly
prejudicial risk."' 27 This mandated consideration of evidentiary alterna-
tives could assist defendants in their arguments to exclude out-of-court
accusations when offered as background. Often, there is a good deal of
nonhearsay evidence available concerning the background of the police
investigation (e.g., checks of records, surveillance, etc.), and this evi-
dence does not present the same risk of misuse as does an out-of-court
accusation. Under the Old Chief analysis, the out-of-court accusation
would have to be excluded under Rule 403 where equally probative and
less risky background evidence is available.
The specific section of the Old Chief opinion that Ms. Hervic seems
to find so objectionable is the portion of the opinion that addresses the
government's argument that it should never have to accept a defendant's
stipulation.28 The government in Old Chief argued that it had free rein
to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, and therefore that a
defendant never has the power to "stipulate or admit his way out of the
full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present
it."' 29 The Court agreed with this as a general proposition. Justice Sou-
ter noted, correctly in my view, that in reality stipulations are rarely as
effective as actual evidence.30 Juries want to hear a story, not an instruc-
tion. If jurors hear a stipulation rather than a story, they may draw a
negative inference against the party with the burden of proof, i.e., they
may conclude that the party is hiding some weakness by accepting a
26. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 192.
27. Id. at 183.
28. Id. at 177.
29. Id. at 186-87.
30. Id. at 188-89.
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stipulation. Any practicing lawyer would agree with the Old Chief
Court that the "persuasive power of the concrete and particular is often
essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law
places on them" and that "a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no
match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it."' a
Ms. Hervic states that Justice Souter, in this section of the majority
opinion in Old Chief, expresses the view (in her words) "that in a crimi-
nal case, the jury is entitled to know the whole story behind the arrest of
the defendant, and thus by implication [Justice Souter] sanctioned the
introduction of out-of-court statements in recounting the story leading to
an arrest." 2 But Justice Souter expressed nothing of the kind. The
opinion does not even refer to proof about a defendant's arrest. The
word "arrest" appears only one time in the opinion, as a reference to the
historical background fact that Old Chief had been arrested for his
crime. 3 There is simply nothing in Old Chief to support the premise
that the government now has carte blanche to admit out-of-court accusa-
tions as "background" evidence.
Far from being rabidly pro-prosecution, the Old Chief Court was
rightfully wary about an opponent's attempts to stipulate away relevant
evidence. There is a real danger that the proponent of relevant evidence
can be "sandbagged" by an opponent who proffers a stipulation. The
proffered stipulation may well be crafted in such a way as to deny the
proponent the fair effect of the evidence. Forced stipulations are prob-
lematic because it is rare for relevant evidence to be offered to prove
only a single point in dispute in a trial.3 ' A single piece of evidence
often proves more than one disputed point. A common risk of stipula-
tions is that the opponent will offer to stipulate to the fact in such a way
that the stipulation is probative on only one of the multiple points on
which the evidence is actually relevant. If the proponent is forced to
accept that stipulation, then the stipulation will deprive the proponent of
the rightful weight of the evidence. To take an easy example: eyewit-
ness testimony that the defendant shot the victim will usually prove a
number of points in issue. The bare fact of shooting proves the act of
shooting, but the circumstances seen by the eyewitness will usually be
evocative of the defendant's intent or absence of mistake. Assume that
the defendant offers to stipulate that he shot the victim. The Court in
31. Id. at 187.
32. Hervic, supra note 25, at 779.
33. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174.
34. Old Chief was such a rare case; proof of a prior conviction was offered on a single
point-the defendant's status as a felon for purposes of a felon-firearm-possession charge. But as
the Court in Old Chief noted, most relevant evidence cannot be so easily confined to a single
issue. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 179.
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Old Chief is right to declare that the government should not be forced to
accept that stipulation because to do so would rob the evidence of its fair
weight in proving intent. This is not to speak of all the other deleterious
consequences of forced stipulations, e.g., depriving the jury of tradi-
tional means of proof and a full narrative.
Additionally, stipulations are problematic because the opponent has
an incentive to frame the stipulation in such a way as to give away as
little ground as possible. Lawyers being as they are, there is a possibil-
ity that a stipulation does not even concede a single point on which the
evidence is offered. For example, in United States v. Colon,35 the defen-
dant was charged with intent to distribute narcotics, specifically that he
was operating as a "steerer" in a drug transaction (i.e., as a conspirator
who "steered" prospective buyers to the conspirator holding the drugs).
The government planned to offer the defendant's prior steering convic-
tions to prove intent. Defense counsel sought to head this off by proffer-
ing a stipulation. He offered to stipulate that if the government proved
that Colon knew the drug seller and was in fact directing the undercover
buyer specifically to that drug seller, "then I will acknowledge that he
intended to violate the federal narcotics law and intended to aid in the
sale of drugs."3 6 But this stipulation was rightly rejected, because in
effect, the stipulation said, "if you can prove intent, then I admit intent."
The court concluded that defense counsel's offer "stipulated nothing."37
Tactics like these indicate that the Old Chief Court was rightfully wary
of holding that a defendant can control the government's choice of proof
by way of stipulation.
All this appropriate caution about forced stipulations in Old Chief
does not translate into a receptiveness to admitting out-of-court accusa-
tions as background evidence. A court that is suspicious about stipula-
tions is not thereby accepting of hearsay. A defendant who moves to
exclude evidence on grounds of hearsay and prejudice is in no sense as
problematic as a defendant who tries to control the government's proof
by forcing it to accept a stipulation.
Perhaps Ms. Hervic is concerned that the prosecution can use the
premise of Old Chief-that the prosecution generally has the right to tell
the story of the crime through evidence rather than stipulation-as the
springboard to a more dramatic argument that the prosecution has the
right to tell the story of the crime with whatever evidence it chooses to
present. But this would be a preposterous extension of Old Chief. The
Court in Old Chief provided a careful analysis of how the defendant
35. 880 F.2d 650 (2nd Cir. 1989).
36. Id. at 654.
37. Id.
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could use Rule 403 to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence; it did not in
any way imply that the government can now tell its story free from the
strictures of all exclusionary rules of evidence.
The argument for such a dramatic extension of Old Chief was
forcefully rebuffed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Evans, as dis-
cussed above. In Evans, the Court found error when an out-of-court
accusation was proffered and admitted as background evidence.38 It was
not enough that the prosecution wanted to tell its story in its own way.
The Court explained:
It is true, of course, that as a general matter the prosecution is entitled
to present the "whole story" of criminal misconduct in order to guard
against just such an eventuality. See Old Chief v. United States, 519
U.S. 172 (1997); United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1207
(D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc). 39 But in presenting that story, the govern-
ment is as much bound by the rules of evidence as it is on any other
issue. No matter how important it is for the government to present a
complete, morally compelling narrative, it must present that narrative
through admissible evidence, not through hearsay.40
In sum, Ms. Hervic misreads the import and intent of Old Chief
There is still plenty of room in the federal courts to exclude an out-of-
court accusation offered as background when its probative value for this
nonhearsay purpose is substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury
will misuse the accusation as proof of the defendant's guilt.
It is especially unsettling for Ms. Hervic to complain that the fed-
eral courts have used Old Chief as a "launching pad" for the wholesale
use of hearsay when offered for background. 41 The proffered evidence
that Old Chief is being exploited in this manner is notably unconvincing.
The three cases supporting the point, cited by Ms. Hervic in her footnote
forty-eight, preceded Old Chief The most recent of the cited cases was
decided ten years before Old Chief
What's more, none of the cited cases support the proposition that
federal courts routinely fail to scrutinize out-of-court accusations when
38. United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
39. In Crowder, the Court held that the government was not required to accept the
defendant's stipulation that he intended to commit the narcotics crime with which he was charged.
The proffered stipulation was an attempt to prevent the government from introducing evidence of
Crowder's prior drug crimes to prove intent to commit the charged crime. The Crowder Court
cited Old Chief, as well as this author, for the proposition that the government is permitted to
prove intent through admissible proof, and is not forced to accept a stipulation on the intent
element of a crime. Crowder, 141 F.3d at 1208-09. Neither Crowder nor Old Chief, however,
stand for the proposition that the prosecution can tell the story its own way, unconstrained by rules
of admissibility. Instead, both cases stand for the proposition that the prosecution generally can tell
the story its own way, unconstrained by a defendant's proffered stipulation.
40. Evans, 216 F.3d at 86-87.
41. Hervic, supra note 25, at 779.
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offered as background. In United States v. Freeman,42 evidence of an
accusation by a confidential informant was offered to explain why
officers had the defendant under surveillance on a day when he received
counterfeit money. The officers had received a report from an informant
that two people, Martin and Grady, were passing counterfeit money.
The informant also stated that Martin and Grady planned to meet with an
unidentified white male on a particular weekend for the purpose of pass-
ing counterfeit money. The officer then undertook surveillance of Martin
and Grady, and in following them he witnessed their meeting with Free-
man on the identified weekend.43 The court held that it was within the
trial court's discretion to find that the probative value of the informant's
tip as background was not substantially outweighed by the risk that the
jury would consider the accusation for its truth." Thus, both trial and
appellate court in Freeman conducted a Rule 403 analysis-neither
court found the evidence automatically admissible as soon as the prose-
cution said the word "background."
More importantly, the Freeman Court's Rule 403 analysis was
surely correct. The jury was bound to wonder how the police could be
in the position to testify that they saw a counterfeit money transaction
take place. Were they just on patrol and happened to spot suspicious
counterfeiters? If that was the purported scenario, the testimony of the
officer would be implausible and suspect. The prosecution clearly had a
legitimate interest in preventing jury speculation on how the officers
came to know what they knew. Of course, there was a risk of prejudice,
i.e., that the jury could use the informant's accusation for its truth. But,
under Rule 403 the risk of prejudice must substantially outweigh proba-
tive value for the accusation to be excluded. A judge could reasonably
conclude that there was no such substantial outweighing under the facts
of Freeman. This is especially so because the confidential informant did
not even identify Freeman by name-this is hardly a fatal accusation
that would surely be misused for its truth. Far from a wholesale admis-
sion of out-of-court accusations as "background," the Freeman decision
represents a good understanding of the relationship between hearsay and
Rule 403. The Freeman court takes a measured approach to the impor-
tant problem addressed by Ms. Hervic.
The second case cited by Ms. Hervic, United States v. Scott,45 con-
tains no discussion at all about the hearsay point, and merely states that
if hearsay was wrongly admitted, it was harmless error.46 And the third
42. 816 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 560.
44. Id. at 563-64.
45. 678 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. Id. at 612.
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case, United States v. Pedroza,47 was one in which the defendant's con-
viction was reversed, in part because hearsay accusations were improp-
erly admitted as "background"-the court declaring that there is no such
thing as a "background" exception to the hearsay rule and that the accu-
sations should have been excluded because they were only probative for
their truth.48 All this is slim evidence indeed on which to base a conclu-
sion that federal courts "regularly" admit out-of-court accusations as
nonhearsay, "even where clearly irrelevant to the matters in issue and/or
unfairly prejudicial and clearly including hearsay. 49 It is no evidence at
all that the Old Chief opinion could be responsible for such a
phenomenon.
The powerful points made by Ms. Hervic are further muted by
overbroad assertions concerning harmless error and curative and limiting
instructions. At one point in the Comment, Ms. Hervic asserts that
admission of an out-of-court accusation as background is always harm-
ful error whenever Rule 403 would have mandated its exclusion. This
assertion is patently overbroad. Clearly such an error can be harmless
under many circumstances. Take a murder case in which the govern-
ment produces four eyewitnesses, reliable DNA evidence, and the defen-
dant's confession. Besides all this evidence, a police officer testifies
that he was told by a confidential informant that the defendant commit-
ted the murder. This testimony should probably have been excluded
under Rule 403, but the error is clearly harmless because the admission
of the evidence had no effect on the verdict.50
A per se rule of harmful error would be extremely costly. It would
result in retrials that usually would end with the same result as the previ-
ous trial. Do we really want to impose such costs on the system, in the
name of process for its own sake? Do we really want to delay justice for
those who have not been tried once by allocating resources to those who
47. 750 F.2d 187 (2nd Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 200.
49. Hervic, supra note 25, at 786.
50. The standard of harmfulness for such a non constitutional error is whether it had
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." United States v.
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986). In the hypothetical case discussed in text, the error would clearly
not rise to this level given the large amount of properly admitted evidence of guilt. If the
defendant makes a confrontation clause objection, an error in admitting hearsay as background
might be one of constitutional dimension. But even if that is so, many errors in admitting hearsay
will still be harmless. The standard of review for a constitutional error is whether it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). If the admissible
evidence of guilt is overwhelming, a court will justifiably hold that erroneously admitted hearsay
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673
(1986) (finding evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause to be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt).
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have already been tried (albeit in a trial that was not perfect) and will be
convicted again?
It is true that some grave constitutional errors can never be harm-
less because they affect the entire structure of the trial. Denial of coun-
sel and denial of jury trial are examples of such grave errors." A
discrete error in admitting prejudicial hearsay, however, does not rise to
that level.52 Indeed, Ms. Hervic's position would lead to the conclusion
that every erroneous admission of hearsay, and indeed every erroneous
admission of prejudicial evidence under Rule 403, would result in an
automatic retrial. Our system simply could not bear the weight of such
perfection.53
Ms. Hervic's attack on jury instructions has merit, but it is also
somewhat overstated. She takes aim at both curative and limiting
instructions, without delineating between them.54 Technically speaking,
a curative instruction is designed to cure error that has occurred at trial,
while a limiting instruction is designed to limit the jury's use of evi-
dence to the purpose for which it was properly admitted. A limiting
instruction is not correcting an error because the evidence was properly
admitted for a certain purpose.
Ms. Hervic is certainly correct that one should not place too much
confidence in the curative powers of a curative instruction. Yet, it is too
much to say that such an instruction will never be effective or that rever-
sal should always be required. Practicing lawyers and judges often
remark on the ability of jurors to follow most instructions. Jurors who
have been interviewed have generally stated that they followed the
judge's instructions and excluded certain evidence from consideration.
As Professor Damaska has pointed out, instructions will usually have a
subtle yet positive effect-they will prevent jurors from making argu-
ments during deliberations that are directly contrary to the instructions.55
The juror in her own mind may disregard an instruction, but she would
not indicate such a blatant disregard in discussions with other jurors, and
51. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1501-
06 (6th ed. 2000).
52. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (holding that error in admitting an
involuntary confession is a discrete evidentiary error, not a structural error affecting the entirety of
the trial; therefore it is subject to harmless error review).
53. I don't mean to say that the harmless error doctrine is never abused. Indeed, cases can be
found in which an appellate court will dodge a trial court error by making a questionable finding
of harmlessness. I only mean to say that a rule of automatic reversal for virtually every
evidentiary error is simply unworkable.
54. Ms. Hervic is not alone in grouping curative and limiting instructions. See, e.g., United
States v. Universal Rehabilitation Services, 205 F.3d 657 (3rd Cir. 2000) (en banc) (both majority
and dissenting judges speak of a "curative" and a "limiting" instructions without distinguishing
between them).
55. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFr (1997).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
so her arguments would be limited by the appropriately admitted evi-
dence. For example, if an accusation is improperly admitted and the
judge tells the jury to disregard it, it is unlikely that a juror will bring up
that accusation in the course of deliberations to try to persuade other
jurors to vote guilty. Thus, to that extent, the deliberations will not be
tainted by the error.
Limiting instructions are more complicated. It is certainly possible
for a limiting instruction to be so confusing as to be impossible for a lay
juror to follow. This was certainly one of the problems with the instruc-
tion in the case relied on by Ms. Hervic, Bruton v. United States.56
Bruton's codefendant Evans had confessed to the crime, implicating
both himself and Bruton. The jury was instructed that it had to consider
the statement as proof of Evans's guilt, but that it could not consider the
statement as proof of Bruton's guilt.57 The Court found the instruction
insufficient to protect Bruton's right to confrontation. It reasoned that it
was impossible for lay jurors to follow such an instruction given the fact
that the accusation was "powerfully incriminating" and the jury was
instructed to use it for its truth against Evans but not at all against
Bruton.58 Such a differential use instruction might well be more diffi-
cult to follow than a curative instruction, which simply tells a juror not
to consider the evidence for any purpose, to strike it from your mind.
If a trial judge admits an out-of-court accusation as background,
then upon request the trial judge will give a limiting instruction. Specif-
ically, the jury will be instructed that the accusation is to be used only as
proof of the background police investigation, and not as proof that the
defendant committed the crime. This kind of instruction is undeniably
similar to the instruction that the Court found insufficient to protect the
defendant's confrontation rights in Bruton. By way of distinction, an
argument could be made that it is easier to understand an instruction to
use evidence for one purpose and not another, than it is to understand an
instruction to use evidence against one person and not another. The
more fundamental point is that where a court instructs the jury that it
should consider an accusation only to explain the police investigation
and not as evidence of guilt, that court has already made the determina-
tion that the evidence is admissible under Rule 403. In other words, the
probative value of the accusation as background is not substantially out-
weighed by the risk of misuse of the accusation for its truth. 59 Thus, the
56. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
57. Id. at 125.
58. Id.
59. This is unlike Bruton, where the accusation was not admissible against Bruton for any
purpose-so the solution for protecting Bruton's rights was not a limiting instruction but rather
severance of the defendants or redaction of the confession.
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limiting instruction is not used as an excuse for admitting otherwise
inadmissible evidence. Rather, it is used as a protective measure for
limiting the negative impact of evidence already found to be admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The trial court does not say, "I am
not balancing probative value and prejudicial effect, I'll just admit the
hearsay and give a limiting instruction." Instead, the trial court says,
"after balancing probative value and prejudicial effect, I find the accusa-
tion to be admissible as background; I will give a limiting instruction to
protect the defendant against the prejudice which I have found does not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the accusation as
background."
It is true that in conducting the balance under Rule 403, the court
will consider the likely effect of the limiting instruction in controlling
prejudice.6" It is possible that the trial court may overestimate the
impact that the instruction will have. If so, the court will improperly
minimize the weight of the prejudice that will be balanced against the
probative value. Such an overestimation of the effect of a limiting
instruction is certainly cause for concern and leaves room for abuse. It
does not follow that a limiting instruction is simply an excuse used by
trial courts to paper over its errors. Rather, the limiting instruction for-
malizes the Rule 403 balance already struck by the trial court-if that
balance is incorrect, it does not get sanctified by a limiting instruction.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Hervic has highlighted an important evidentiary problem that is
of legitimate concern to criminal defendants. Certainly, it is inappropri-
ate to admit out-of-court accusations automatically whenever the prose-
cution says it's offered for "background." We don't want a broad
"background" exception to the hearsay rule. Certainly, there are cases in
which hearsay accusations have been improperly admitted as "back-
ground." I don't believe, however, that the federal courts are completely
inattentive to the risks involved in admitting out-of-court accusations
under the guise of "background." Indeed, the Evans case, with which
this essay began, shows an appropriate consideration of the matter under
Rule 403. Moreover, I am not at all persuaded that the United States
60. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 260-61 (7th ed. 1998). See also United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934,
943 (2nd Cir. 1980) (stating that when balancing probative value and prejudicial effect under Rule
403, the trial judge "should carefully consider the likely effectiveness of a cautionary instruction
that tries to limit the jury's consideration of the evidence to the purpose for which it is
admissible"; the trial judge, "sensitive to the realities of the courtroom context as in all other trial
rulings, must simply include a sound estimate of the likely force of limiting instructions in the
overall Rule 403 determination").
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Supreme Court's decision in Old Chief can be used to establish anything
like a "background" exception to the hearsay rule. That certainly has
not been the case so far.
In my role as reporter to the Judicial Conference Advisory Commit-
tee on Evidence Rules, I am essentially an employee of the federal
courts. So one might say that I am biased when I defend those courts
against a charge that they are engaged in a wholesale abrogation of the
hearsay rule specifically and a wholesale trampling on the rights of
criminal defendants generally. Perhaps I am biased, and I know there
are cases in which evidence is admitted against criminal defendants that
should in fairness have been excluded. I must say, however, that I see
little support for broad assertions of gloom and doom. Instead, I see
written opinions that exclude accusations offered for background when
the evidence is not very probative and the risk of misuse is high. More
fundamentally, I see trial judges excluding government-proffered evi-
dence, even though there is a good argument for its admissibility under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Quite often, trial judges exclude what
appears to be admissible evidence on the ground that it would simply be
unfair to admit it against the defendant. 6 These trial court decisions are
not reported, and are not generally subject to appeal. But, those exclu-
sions at ground level are an important, and hopefully continuing, source
of protection for criminal defendants.
61. Prior crimes are a good example. I have had discussions with a number of federal district
judges who say that they often exclude evidence of a defendant's prior narcotics convictions when
the government offers them to prove intent to commit the drug crime charged. When I point out
that the Supreme Court in Old Chief, and indeed their own circuits, have permitted such proof, the
response has been that to admit such crimes is simply unfair and they often exercise their
discretion under Rule 403 to exclude them-unless the defendant takes the stand and testifies that
he is anti-drug and would never be involved with drugs.
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